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EVIDENCE
By

WILLIAM

H.

AGNOR*

The usual number of cases concerning one or more points of evidence
were decided during the survey period. Only those cases that seemed significant or of general interest have been discussed herein.
I.

HEARSAY

The res gestae exception to the hearsay rule continues to be popular with
the courts, if not with the writers. It is a convenient exception.' In
Salleywhite v. State' it was held that a statement made by the victim of
an assault to a doctor in the emergency room an hour after the assault was
a part of the res gestae. In Robinson v. State3 the statement of the victim
of a rape was admissible as part of the res gestae, even though the six-yearold child might not have been competent as a witness.
The Civil Practice Act did not affect the rule that admissions in pleadings are conclusive.' In Hill v. State5 the conduct of the defendant while
in custody did not amount to a tacit admission. A denial in general terms
by the accused of the statement made to her will prevent such a statement
from being a tacit admission.
Records prepared in the regular course of business are admissible, even
though they are not signed by anyone.6 Hospital records containing large
amounts of hearsay other than regular entries continue to cause a problem.7 This was clearly pointed out in Bowen v. Sentry Insurance Co.' In
that case the superior court judge had correctly held that the hospital
records admitted in toto by the deputy director in a workman's compensation case were inadmissible. They consisted of 166 pages of hospital records
from two hospitals introduced in toto and without discrimination. Judge
Clark's admonition in that case is worth repeating:
In calling this "paper chase" to the attention of the bar we do not intend
to be critical of the lawyers involved in the instant case. They have done
only what has become common usage in today's Xerox world. It is our
prayer that mention of this Xeroxmania will remind our attorneys that as
*

Simmons Professor of Law, Emory University. Emory University (Ph.B., 1935; J.D.,

1937); University of Virginia (S.J.D., 1956).
1. See Gaines v. State, 232 Ga. 727, 208 S.E.2d 798 (1974); Scott v. State, 131 Ga. App.
655, 206 S.E.2d 558 (1974).
2. 133 Ga. App. 170, 210 S.E.2d 334 (1974).
3. 232 Ga. 123, 205 S.E.2d 210 (1974).
4. Anderson v. Oakley, 133 Ga. App. 758, 212 S.E.2d 875 (1975).
5. 232 Ga. 800, 209 S.E.2d 153 (1974).
6. F. N. Roberts Corp. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 132 Ga. App. 800, 209 S.E.2d
138 (1974).
7. See Emmett v. State, 232 Ga. 110, 205 S.E.2d 231 (1974).
8. 134 Ga. App. 88, 213 S.E.2d 185 (1975).
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officers of the court they should remember they have the duty to assist
the judiciary. Georgia advocates aid immeasurably through well-argued
briefs presenting their extensive research. When undertaking to provide
appeal records which advocates wish to be read and studied by the appellate courts, they should be selective and apply the litmus test of relevancy.
So mote it be?

I.

RELEVANCY

A.

Generally

The inadmissibility of admissions made with a view to compromise was
considered in several cases." In one of the "rocking chair" cases, a list of
other items missing from the house but not involved in that burglary
charge was not relevant and its admission was prejudicial." Evidence of
the general competency of the driver of an automobile involved in a collision is usually not relevant. However, the situation in Carter v. Tatum 2
was unusual. There the defendant testified at the trial some four years
after the occurrence. Counsel sought to show that there had been a deterioration in the defendant's health of considerable magnitude during the fouryear period. It was held that evidence of the defendant's condition at the
time of the collision was admissible and relevant and that it was error to
exclude such evidence.
B.

Character

In Price v. State3 the court followed the ruling in Lynn v. State4 which
held that the victim of an alleged rape may not be cross-examined as to
specific acts of prior sexual intercourse with men other than the accused.
Generally, evidence of other offenses committed by a defendant in a
criminal case is not admissible and would be prejudicial as an attack on
his character.'5 Where the other offense or offenses are relevant to show
intent, motive, plan, scheme or bent of mind and not general bad character, the evidence is admissible." The problem frequently arises in rape
cases where evidence of other rapes or sexual offenses by the defendant is
presented. In Larkins v. State'7 it had been held that evidence of other
rapes was not admissible where identification of the perpetrator was not
9. Id. at 91, 213 S.E.2d at 188.
10. Jester v. State, 133 Ga. App. 652, 211 S.E.2d 909 (1975); White v. The Front Page,
Inc., 133 Ga. App. 749, 213 S.E.2d 32 (1975).
11. Hess v. State, 132 Ga. App. 26, 207 S.E.2d 580 (1974), petition for cert. pending.
12. 134 Ga. App. 345, 212 S.E.2d 439 (1975).
13. 233 Ga. 332, 211 S.E.2d 290 (1974).
14. 231 Ga. 559, 203 S.E.2d 221 (1974).
15. See Nooner v. State, 131 Ga. App. 563, 206 S.E.2d 660 (1974); Casey v. State, 133
Ga. App. 161, 210 S.E.2d 375 (1974).
16. Bloodworth v. State, 233 Ga. 589, 212 S.E.2d 774 (1975).
17. 230 Ga. 418, 197 S.E.2d 367 (1973).
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involved and the issue was whether there had been consent. In Hunt v.
8
State,"
a four to three decision, the majority of the court disapproved
Larkins and held that evidence of another offense of rape and sodomy was
properly received in evidence where the issue was consent.
In Luke v. State9 the defendant was arrested at the scene of a burglary.
At the time of his arrest, a pistol and a bottle of pills were found on him.
They were admitted in evidence at his trial for burglary. The court of
appeals held that since the articles had no logical connection to the crime
of burglary, their admission was error. In State v. Luke 0 the supreme court
reversed and held that all the circumstances connected with the arrest
were admissible as part of the res gestae.
C.

Scientific Evidence

In the most recent appearances of Emmett v. State" and Creamer v.
State" it was held that the reliability of hypnosis had not been established
and that statements made while a witness was in a trance were inadmissible. However, the hypnotic sessions did not taint the testimony of the
witness on the stand and render it inadmissible.
Problems with regard to the polygraph or lie detector continue to arise.
In Cagle v. State3 it was error to admit the results of a polygraph test given
to the defendant. The court said that this was true in this absence of an
express stipulation as to its admissibility. This was probably based on
language in Harrell v. State. 24 Although Harrell was not cited, it seems to
indicate that the results of a polygraph test would be admissible based on
an advance agreement between the solicitor and counsel for the defendant.
In Famber v. State2 5 the court seems to have rejected this view, again
without citing the Harrell case. In the Famber case the court said that even
where the defendant had consented to a polygraph test of a co-conspirator
and agreed that the results of the test would be admitted in evidence, the
results of the polygraph test were not only inadmissible but also had no
probative value. Thus, the testimony of the co-conspirator was uncorroborated. The ruling in the Famber case seems proper.
Even though the results of a polygraph test are not admissible, the
question remains as to statements made by a subject to the polygraph
operator before, during, and after the test. This problem was considered
in Stack v. State26 at some length. In that case the polygraph operator was
permitted to testify to statements made to him by the defendant during
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

233
131
232
232
232
132
108
134
234

Ga.
Ga.
Ga.
Ga.
Ga.
Ga.
Ga.
Ga.
Ga.

329, 211 S.E.2d 288 (1974).
App. 799, 207 S.E.2d 213 (1974).
815, 209 S.E.2d 165 (1974).
110, 205 S.E. 2d 231 (1974).
136, 205 S.E.2d 240 (1974).
App. 227, 207 S.E. 2d 703 (1974).
App. 295, 132 S.E.2d 787 (1963).
App. 112, 213 S.E.2d 525 (1975).
19, 214 S.E.2d 514 (1975).
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the progress of the test. The identity of the witness was made known to
the jury, as well as the fact that the defendant had taken a polygraph test.
An accomplice of the defendant had also taken a polygraph test and this
was made known to the jury. The majority of the court held that the jury
would draw an inference as to the results of the test and thus the state had
indirectly injected into the case evidence which was otherwise inadmissible. This operated to the prejudice of the defendant and required a reversal. The case of Johnson v. Aetna Insurance Co. 7 was distinguished, since
in that case the admissions were made to the operator after the test and
the jury had not been informed that the witness who testified to the admissions was an operator. One justice concurred specially, with doubt as to
whether or not the proper rule had been followed as to the defendant's
statements. Another justice concurred in the judgment only. Two justices
dissented, stating that the issue was whether or not the statements of the
defendant were freely and voluntarily made.
1H.

BURDENS

Under Ga. Code Ann. §79A-1105 (Rev. 1973), the authority of the defendant to possess and sell certain narcotic drugs is made a matter of defense
and not an element of the offense. In Woods v. State" the defendant
contented that this shifted the burden of proof to him and was an unconstitutional deprivation of due process. The court held that this was a proper
affirmative defense and sustained the statute. This problem of affirmative
defenses in criminal cases may well be an area of future problems.2 9 The
case of Smith v. State3 0 considered the matter of insanity as a defense and
may have cast some doubt on Grace v. State,3' but it clearly was not error
to fail to give the charge requested by the defendant. Abner v. State 2
considered a charge concerning accident as a defense in a murder case. The
court approved the charge given over the defendant's objection that it
shifted the burden of proof to the defendant on the issue of accident. Three
justices concurred on the ground that the charge, as given, only placed the
burden of producing evidence on the defendant. Justice Gunter dissented
on the ground that the charge, as given, improperly shifted the burden of
persuasion on the issue of accident to the defendant.
The problem of the charge on alibi has finally been laid to rest and the
headstone erected; may it rest in peace. The problem was considered at
length in Pattersonv. State.3 In this case the trial judge had given a charge
27. 124 Ga. App. 112, 183 S.E.2d 85 (1971).
28. 233 Ga. 347, 211 S.E.2d 300 (1974); see also Lyle v. State, 131 Ga. App. 8, 205 S.E.2d
126 (1974).
29.

See Agnor, Annual Survey of Georgia Law: Evidence, 26 MERCER L. REV. 93, 98 (1974).
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99, 205 S.E.2d 188 (1974).
113, 200 S.E.2d 248 (1973).
922, 213 S.E.2d 851 (1975).
724, 213 S.E.2d 612 (1975).
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on alibi that placed the burden of persuasion on the defendant as to alibi.
Justice Hall, citing Judge Hall's opinion in Parham v. State," held the
charge to be erroneous. However, since the counsel for the defendant had
requested the charge, it was not error to give it. Although there were some
dissents from the opinion with regard to the charge, the entire court has
now approved the following charge on alibi, much like the charge suggested
in the Parham case:
All seven Justices of this court approve the following charge on "alibi"
based upon Special Charge 6, Pattern Jury Insturctions - Criminal, prepared by Committee on Pattern Jury Instruction, Council of Superior
Court Judges of Georgia: "Now, the defendant in this case contends that
he was not present at the scene of the offense at the time of its commission.
In that connection I charge you that alibi as a defense involves the impossibility of the accused's presence at the scene of the offense at the time of
its commission. Presence of the defendant at the scene of the crime(s)
alleged or his involvement as a co-conspirator is an essential element of
the crime(s) set forth in this indictment, and the burden of proof as to
such issue rests upon the State as I have instructed you already. Any
evidence in the nature of an alibi should be considered by the jury in
connection with all other facts in the case, and if, in doing so, the jury
should entertain a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, they
should acquit.""
IV.

DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE

Central of Georgia R.R. v. Collins" was an action to enjoin a nuisance
resulting from the noise of a railroad car weighing operation. One issue
involved the admission, over defendants' objection, of a cassette recording
of the noise made by the wife of the plaintiff. Stating that it was a question
of first impression in Georgia, the court held there was no reason not to
admit a sound recording of something other than the human voice. The
sound recording had been properly authenticated, so it was properly admitted. With reference to laying the proper foundation for admissibility,
the court adopted the requirements of Steve M. Solomon, Jr., Inc. v.
Edgar.3 The Solomon case had set out the requirements for laying the
foundation for admissibility of a sound recording of a human voice. Here
the court varied these requirements slightly as follows:
We hold that the requirements of the Solomon case are adequate to
determine admissibility of sound recordings such as this. Solomon required as a proper foundation for admissibility of a recording, that (1) it
must be shown that the device was capable of taking testimony (for which
34. 120 Ga. App. 723, 171 S.E.2d 911 (1969).
35. 233 Ga. at 730 n. 2, 213 S.E.2d at 617 n. 2.
36. 232 Ga. 790, 209 S.E.2d 1 (1974).
37. 92 Ga. App. 207, 88 S.E.2d 167 (1955), followed in State v. Williams, 49 Wash. 2d 354,
301 P.2d 769 (1956); see also Annot., Sound Recordings In Evidence, 58 A.L.R.2d 1024 (1958).
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we interpolate here 'noise of the type attempted to be recorded'); (2) it
must .be shown that the operation was competent; (3) the authenticity and
correctness of the recording must be established; (4) changes, additions
or deletions must be ruled out; (5) the manner of preservation of the record
must be shown; (6) speakers must be identified; (7) it must be shown that
the testimony was elicited freely and without duress. Naturally, 6 may be
and 7 clearly is irrelevant to a noise transcription.3
V.

WRITINGS

Hatgimisios39

Smith v.
involved an attempt to authenticate some letters
by circumstantial evidence that failed. Ga. Code Ann. §38-706.1 (Rev.
1974) was enacted to permit a patient, and certain others for him, to
identify certain medical bills without other authentication. Glover v.
Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.4 0 raised the question as to
whether or not a chiropractor's bill would be admissible under this section.
The answer was negative.
Pugh v: Jones' involved the application of the best evidence rule to an
affidavit filed in regard to a motion hearing. Plaintiffs attorney had submitted an affidavit reciting his findings and conclusions with reference to
certain tax returns allegedly made by defendant. The court correctly
stated that the so-called "best evidence rule" was the "original document
rule" and that it was violated here by this affidavit as the tax returns
themselves, or certified copies thereof, were primary evidence.
VI.

WITNESSES

A.

Generally

After the rule of sequestration of the witnesses has been invoked, the
trial judge still has a broad discretion in permitting a witness to remain
at the counsel table. It is better practice to require that the witness who
has remained in the courtroom should be first examined, but this, too, is
a matter of discretion. 2 However, the court can abuse its discretion. In
Walker v. State 3 the trial judge permitted a police officer and the mother
of the victim in a murder case to remain at the counsel table. Since there
was no showing that the presence of the mother of the victim was necessary
for an orderly presentation of the case, this was an abuse of discretion and
error.
38. 233 Ga.
39. 233 Ga.
40. 132 Ga.
41. 131 Ga.
42. Jackson
214 S.E.2d 365
cert. pending.
43. 132 Ga.

at 794, 209 S.E.2d at 5.
354, 211 S.E.2d 306 (1974).
App. 74, 207 S.E.2d 584 (1974), petition for cert. pending.
App. 600, 206 S.E.2d 650 (1974).
v. State, 233 Ga. 529, 212 S.E.2d 366 (1975); Prevatte v. State, 233 Ga. 929,
(1975); Walker v. State, 132 Ga. App. 274, 208 S.E.2d 5 (1974), petition for
App. 476, 208 S.E.2d 350 (1974), petition for cert. pending.
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The competency of a person called as a witness is an issue to be decided
by the court, including the determination of any question of fact. In one
case, the court found that the woman called as a witness was not the
common law wife of the defendant." In two cases, the court had properly
found young children competent as witnesses." The mere fact that the
child does not know the meaning of the word "oath" is not definitive.
Daniels v. State" considered the general area of the removal of the incompetency of parties and persons interested in litigation and the continued
incompetency under Ga. Code Ann. §38-1606 (Rev. 1974) to actions "instituted in consequence of adultery." In Daniels the defendant was charged
with abandonment of his illegitimate child. The mother of the child testified as to its conception as thus to her adultery since she was married to
one other than the defendant at the time. The court held that the words
"in consequence" apply to the initiatory as well as to the approximate
cause of the suit. Since she was directly interested in the outcome of the
case, she was incompetent to testify to her adultery with the defendant.
In a brief opinion, the supreme court affirmed but emphasized the burden
4
placed on the state and called for amending legislation. 1
8
In Finley v. Franklin Aluminum Co." a state trooper was properly permitted to testify as an expert witness and give his opinion as to the location
of the point of impact in a crash based on his observations at the scene.
B.

Impeachment

As stated in Bentley v. State" the court need not charge on impeachment in the absence of a request. There are several interesting features in
the Bentley case. The judge who dissented on another issue has a first,
second and third addendum to his dissent. The defendant sought to call a
prosecution witness who had not testified for cross-examination. The witness was called as an agent of the state or as a party for whom the suit
was being prosecuted under Ga. Code Ann. §38-1801 (Rev. 1974). The
court held that he was not an agent of the state under that section. The
court seems to have overlooked the fact that the section clearly states "in
the trial of all civil cases" and would not apply in a criminal case.
A witness may be impeached by proof of conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, but not by proof of arrest alone. 50 In Favors v. State5' the
court considered as a question of first impression whether or not a witness
could be impeached by proof of a conviction under the "first offender"
44. Johnson v. State, 232 Ga. 61, 205 S.E.2d 190 (1974).
45. Lashley v. State, 132 Ga. App. 427, 208 S.E.2d 200 (1974); Stonaker v. State, 134 Ga.
App. 123, 213 S.E.2d 506 (1975), petition for cert. pending.
46. 132 Ga. App. 673, 209 S.E.2d 72 (1974).
47. State v. Daniels, 233 Ga. 614, 615, 212 S.E.2d 794, 795 (1975) (per curiam).48. 132 Ga. App. 70, 207 S.E.2d 543 (1974).
49. 131 Ga. App. 425, 205 S.E.2d 904 (1974), petition for cert. pending.
50. Scott v. State, 131 Ga. App. 655, 206 S.E.2d 558 (1974).
51. 234 Ga. 80, 214 S.E.2d 645 (1975).
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act.5" After balancing the right of a first offender against the right of the
defendant in a criminal case, the court held that this was a proper method
of impeachment.
In Walker v. State,53 after the defendant had testified, the court charged
that in regard to his testimony the jury had "the right to take into consideration the fact that he is interested in the result of the prosecution, as well
as his demeanor and conduct on the witness stand." This charge was
proper. When a criminal defendant elects to testify, his credibility is subject to the same attack as that of any other witness, except for
the statutory
5
exclusions of prior convictions and general bad character.
The use of expert testimony by psychiatrists and psychologists to attack
the credibility of a witness has received extensive consideration in recent
years.5 5 This problem was reviewed in the case of Jones v. State.5 6 The
defendant had been indicted on six counts, including two counts of rape.
The defendant sought to have a psychiatrist answer a hypothetical question as to whether a positive identification could have been made by the
victims under the circumstances of the crimes. The court held that the
trial judge had properly sustained the state's objection to this testimony.
C.

Privilege

Young v. State57 again shated the rule that the spouse of a criminal
defendant has a privilege not to testify in the criminal case, but that the
privilege belongs entirely to the witness spouse. Where the witness voluntarily takes the stand and testifies, it will be presumed that the privilege
is waived.
There is still a problem in Georgia in regard to whether the attorneyclient privilege is u true privilege or a matter of incompetency. 5 In recent
habeas corpus cases involving attacks on guilty pleas, attorneys who had
represented ths petitioners at the trials have been permitted to testify as
to information given the petitioners regarding their guilty pleas. 59 The
attorney-client privilege claimed was treated as a true privilege that had
been waived by the habeas corpus claims.
The governmental privilege not to reveal the name or identity of an
informer continues to appear in the cases. 0 The distinction drawn in Georgia between an informer, whose identity is privileged, and a decoy, whose
52. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2727 et. seq. (Rev. 1972).
53. 132 Ga. App. 274, 278, 208 S.E.2d 5, 8 (1974), petition for cert. pending.
54. GA. CODE ANN. §38-415 (Rev. 1974).
55. See Annot., Witness - Credibility - Expert Testimony, 20 A.L.R.3d 684 (1968).
56. 232 Ga. 762, 209 S.E.2d 6 (1974).
57. 232 Ga. 285, 206 S.E.2d 439 (1974).
58. See 29 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GEORGIA LAW, Witnesses, §44.
59. Bailey v. Baker, 232 Ga. 84, 205 S.E.2d 278 (1974); Roberts v. Greenway, 233 Ga. 473,
211 S.E.2d 764 (1975).
60. Thomas v. State, 134 Ga. App. 18, 213 S.E.2d 129 (1975), petition for cert. pending;
Kitchens v. State, 134 Ga. App. 81, 213 S.E.2d 180 (1975).
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identity must be disclosed, has prevented some of the problems that have
arisen elsewhere.' That distinction was approved by the supreme court in
Chancey v. Hancock.6" Chancey involved an action to abate a business
establishment as a public nuisance; the business was "padlocked" as a
result. The court held that even though the individual involved was a
decoy, the case was not a criminal prosecution and his identity did not
have to be disclosed.
VII.

CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGES

Cases involving constitutional privileges should be considered at greater
length in other articles of this survey. However, there are a few areas that
involve specific evidence questions that might be considered here.
A.

Self-Incrimination

Although the unsworn statement has been dead in Georgia for more than
two years, it still raises problems. In Pittman v. State63 the trial took place
at a time when the defendant could remain silent, be sworn as a witness,
or make an unsworn statement. He elected to make an unsworn statement.
At the conclusion of the unsworn statement, his counsel sought to have him
make a sworn statement, which the trial judge refused to permit. The court
approved this action since his rights were in the alternative and by electing
to make an unsworn statement he had waived the right to make a sworn
statement. The question arises as to whether or not the statute abolishing
the unsworn statement is procedural in nature so as to apply in trials after
the effective date of the statute where the crime was committed before that
date. In Walker v. State64 the statute was held to be procedural in nature
and to apply in all trials after its effective date. There was a strong dissent.
However, the question seems to have been settled in Eades v. State15 where
the supreme court held that it was procedural only.
The, scope of the privilege against self-incrimination under the Georgia
statute appears to be broader than the general rule.66 However, this scope
was somewhat restricted in Brooks v. State. 7 In that case, a witness was
married to the sister of the defendant. He tried to claim the privilege since
his testimony would bring infamy, disgrace, or public contempt upon his
61.

The distinction was clearly drawn in Crosby v. State, 90 Ga. App. 63, 82 S.E.2d 38

(1954).

62. 233 Ga. 734, 213 S.E.2d 633 (1975).
63. 133 Ga. App. 902, 212 S.E.2d 505 (1975).
64. 132 Ga. App. 274, 208 S.E.2d 5 (1974), petition for cert. pending.
65. 232 Ga. 735, 208 S.E.2d 791 (1974).
66. GA. CODE ANN. §38-1205 (Rev. 1974) states the scope as including
any matter which may criminate or tend to criminate himself, or which may tend
to work a forfeiture of his estate, or which shall tend to bring infamy or disgrace or
public contempt upon himself or any member of his family.
67. 233 Ga. 524, 212 S.E.2d 355 (1975).
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wife. His claim or privilege was denied. The court affirmed, relying primarily on a treatise and an encyclopedia statement of the general rule. Other
Georgia cases in this area were not considered."'
Lawson v. State"8 involved an unusual factual situation. Two victims
were robbed, at different times, by black persons dressed as females. The
two defendants were spotted, dressed as females, in an automobile that
had been described by an informant. They were photographed in their
female disguise before a warrant was obtained. These photographs were
held to be admissible over a claim of the privilege against selfincrimination.
Simpson v. Simpson" was a custody case. The father's case for a change
in custody was based largely on proof of conduct of the mother and a thirdparty witness. The mother and the witness declined to answer questions
as to their conduct based on claims of the privilege against selfincrimination. As a question of first impression, the court considered the
issue as to whether or not an inference could be drawn against the mother
from the claim of privilege. The court reviewed the rule that no inference
could be drawn in a criminal case against a defendant based on his claim
of the privilege in that case or in any other proceedings. However, that rule
did not control in a civil case. The court held that an inference against the
mother could be drawn by the fact finder, here the trial judge, because of
the claim of privilege.
B.

Confessions

High v. State" followed the rule promulgated by the United States Supreme Court in Lego v. Twomey" that on a hearing to test the voluntariness of a confession, the state need only show voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence. In the absence of a request, it is not error to fail
to charge on voluntariness.73
C.

Search And Electronic Surveillance

There were the usual number of cases involving the validity of search
warrants and attempts to suppress evidence. Following the lead of the
federal cases, it is now much easier to search automobiles without a search
warrant." A roadblock search at Jekyll Island was sustained. 75 The occu68. See, e.g., Bass v. Bass, 222 Ga. 378, 149 S.E.2d 818 (1966).
69. 234 Ga. 136, 214 S.E.2d 559 (1975).
70. 233 Ga. 17, 209 S.E.2d 611 (1974).
71. 233 Ga. 153, 210 S.E.2d 673 (1974).
72. 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
73. See McCorquodale v. State, 233 Ga. 369, 211 S.E.2d 577 (1974). The facts of this case
are unusual, to say the least.
74. Woodruff v. State, 233 Ga. 840, 213 S.E.2d 689 (1975); Howe v. State, 132 Ga. App.
840, 209 S.E.2d 258 (1974); Cunningham v. State, 133 Ga. App. 305, 211 S.E.2d 198 (1974).
75. State v. Swift, 232 Ga. 535, 207 S.E.2d 459 (1974), rev'g Swift v. State, 131 Ga. App.
231, 206 S.E.2d 51 (1974).
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pants of a stolen automobile do not have standing to object to a search of
the stolen automobile."8 Standing to object may be lost by abandonment
of premises or articles."
Georgia agrees with the view that the prohibition against unreasonable
search and seizure contained in the fourth amendment to the Constitution
of the United States does not apply to actions of private individuals." The
situation involved in Young v. State79 presented a variation of this problem. In that case an assistant principal of a public high school directed the
defendant, a 17-year-old student at the school, to empty his pockets in the
principal's office. The defendant had le!s than an ounce of marijuana in
his pocket, for which he was charged and convicted. The court of appeals
held that the school official was a governmental official subject to the
restraints of the fourth amendment and that the evidence should have
been suppressed. The Supreme Court of Georgia recently reversed the
case.80 The court took the approach that a "reasonable suspicion" standard
was enough for such a search and that the standard of probable cause
would not apply. Also, that the assistant principal was not the kind of law
enforcement agent of the state to which the exclusionary rule would apply.
Ga. Code Ann. §25-3004 (Rev. 1971) of the Criminal Code of Georgia
provides the authority for and the details of issuing investigation warrants
for electronic surveillance. This section was considered at length in
Granese v. State;" it was held valid and not subject to the constitutional
attacks made. The investigation warrants involved in the case complied
in every way with the federal requirements.8 2 The court continued by holding that a superior court judge could grant the application in any county
of his circuit in which he was present at the time the warrant was signed.
In Quaid v. State 3 it was held that the exception in Ga. Code Ann. §263006 (Rev. 1972) as to conversations that constitute the commission of a
crime or are directly in furtherance of a crime with the consent of one party
was not limited to law enforcement officers. In State v. Toomey"4 an investigator of the sheriffs department was called in because some unauthorized person was tied into the telephone number assigned to an industrial
concern. The investigator listened to some telephone calls made by the
defendant and, as a result of information obtained from the calls, acquired
a search warrant that resulted in the seizure of some drugs. The court of
appeals affirmed the granting of a motion to suppress this evidence. The
76. Brinks v. State, 232 Ga. 13, 205 S.E.2d 247 (1974); Brisbane v. State, 233 Ga. 339,
211 S.E.2d 294 (1974).
77. Bloodworth v. State, 233 Ga. 589, 212 S.E.2d 774 (1975); Anderson v. State, 133 Ga.
App. 45, 209 S.E.2d 665 (1974).
78. Moye v. Hopper, 234 Ga. 230, 214 S.E.2d 920 (1975).
79. 132 Ga. App. 790, 209 S.E.2d 96 (1974).
80. State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586 (1975).
81. 232 Ga. 193, 206 S.E.2d 26 (1974).
82. 18 U.S.C.A. §2518 (Rev. 1970).
83. 132 Ga. App. 478, 208 S.E.2d 336 (1974), petition for cert. pending.
84. 134 Ga. App. 343, 214 S.E.2d 421 (1975).
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listening by the investigator without an investigation warrant was a clear
violation of Ga. Code Ann. §26-3001 (Rev. 1972).
VIII.

STATUTES

The regular 1975 session of the General Assembly produced only a few
statutes in the area of evidence of general interest.
After several attempts to pass such a statute in recent years, a witness
immunity statute was enacted. 5 This statute would grant immunity to a
witness in a criminal proceeding or before a grand jury and require him to
testify or produce evidence without being able to claim the privilege
against self-incrimination. The attorney general or the district attorney
may request an order from the judge of the superior court and this order
is entered in the minutes of the court. The test is "necessary to the public
interest," but the court does not seem to have a discretion in issuing the
order. The immunity granted is "use" and "derivative use," so this would
seem to fit the federal test."0
Another statute makes records concerning reports of child abuse and
neglect privileged under a governmental privilege."
Under another statute, influencing or attempting to influence witnesses
is made a felony."8
By an amendment to the Georgia Health Code," provision was made for
inspection warrants. The procedure is much like that for a search warrant,
but for some unexplained reason, it is provided that no facts discovered or
evidence obtained in an inspection would be admissible in any criminal
proceeding against any party. Quaere as to a few kilograms of heroin?

IX.

FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE

Under Public Law 93-595 of the 93rd Congress, enacted January 2, 1975,
the Federal Rules of Evidence became effective on July 1, 1975. This, of
course, is not the place for a consideration of these rules. This opportunity
is taken, however, to emphasize that they are now in effect.
85. Ga. Laws
86. Kastigar
Immunity, 32 L.
87. Ga. Laws

1975, p. 727.
v. U.S., 406 U.S. 441 (1972); see also Annot., Self-Incrimination Ed.2d 869 (1973).
1975, p. 1135.

88.

GA. CODE ANN. §26-2313 (Supp. 1975).

89.

Ga. Laws 1975, p. 693.

